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Abstract
Peter Baumann offers the tantalizing suggestion that Thomas Reid is
almost, but not quite, a pragmatist. He motivates this claim by posing
a dilemma for common sense philosophy: Will it be dogmatism or scepticism? Baumann claims that Reid points to but does not embrace a
pragmatist third way between these unsavory options. If we understand
‘pragmatism’ differently than Baumann does, however, we need not be so
equivocal in attributing it to Reid. Reid makes what we could call an
argument from practical commitment, and this is plausibly an instance of
what William James calls the pragmatic method.
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The dilemma

Peter Baumann [Bau99] suggests that Reid’s common sense philosophy faces
a dilemma. The dilemma develops in this way: Reid answers the sceptic by
arguing that it is a matter of common sense (e.g.) that our senses teach us
about an external world. Yet, as Reid is well aware, these principles of common
sense could be false. Should we believe in them or not?
1st horn: We believe the principles of common sense. If we accept the
burden of proving the beliefs, then we will run afoul of sceptical arguments
and have to stop believing them. So we must accept the beliefs without proof.
This is dogmatism, the scandal of philosophy that Kant bemoans wherein “the
existence of things outside us. . . must be accepted merely on faith” [Kan29, p.
Bxxxix fn.].
2nd horn: We do not believe the principles of common sense. We decline
from making knowledge claims and thus avoid any justificatory burden. Yet
this is to abdicate to scepticism.
The dilemma, then, is between dogmatism and scepticism. We either believe
as we do without justification or we decline to believe.
1
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Baumann’s invocation of pragmatism

Baumann sees Reid as aiming to find a third way between the horns of this
dilemma. Reid acknowledges that first principles are not acquired by an exercise
of reason. In a passage that Baumann cites approvingly, Reid writes: “Most
men continue all their days to be just what Nature and human education made
them. Their manners, their opinions, their virtues, and their vices, are all got
by habit, imitation, and instruction; and reason has little or no share in forming
them” [Inq, ch 6 §24, p. 201].1 If we acquire them without reason, then why
should we need a reason to keep them?
Baumann calls this element of Reid’s thinking a “pragmatic twist” [Bau99,
p. 53]. He explicates it as an argument that asking for a theoretical justification
of common sense principles is not merely asking too much, it is a meaningless
question. The “pragmatic justification” goes like this:
To ask for reasons here is to fundamentally misunderstand what a
first principle is. . . . The principles of common sense enable us to
build theories which guide our actions and let us attain our goals.
Insofar as they fulfill this function, they are justified and there is no
place for a different kind of justification, no need to talk about truth
or knowledge. [Bau99, p. 53]
Baumann sees Reid as broaching but not developing a pragmatic justification
of this kind.
The pragmatism here consists of two separable elements: First, a claim that
it is meaningless to ask for justification of common sense principles. Second,
a claim that we should accept principles of common sense because they get
us what we want. Baumann sees the first element as charting the third way
between the horns of the dilemma. If asking for justification makes no sense,
then we needn’t either claim to know or claim not to know that principles of
common sense are true. Truth leaves the picture. As Baumann notes, this
begins to sound like what Wittgenstein says in On Certainty [Wit69].
In one sense, the second element alone would be sufficient to answer the
dilemma. We believe principles of common sense. If asked why we believe them,
we can say that we have certain projects that are served by believing them. Yet
this is subject to the usual objections against pragmatism.2 We say that “There
is a world” is true, for instance, because we think believing in a world will prove
to be advantageous. What justifies this further claim that “Believing ‘There
is a world’ will prove advantageous”? We have no more way of proving that
believing in a world will be useful than we have of proving that there is a world.
Perhaps this is why Baumann thinks the pragmatic appeal to interest must be
supplemented with a Wittgensteinian moratorium on truth talk. If we refuse to
say that the principles of common sense are “true,” then truth is at issue neither
for the principle of common sense nor for its usefulness. The objection is evaded,
1 ‘Inq’

refers to Reid’s Inquiry into the Human Mind of 1764. Page numbers refer to [Rei67].
expresses worries of this kind in his widely-influential discussion of the pragmatic
theory of truth [Rus45, p. 817].
2 Russell
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Figure 1: Reid argues that the sceptic, were he determined and consistent,
would meet with tragedy.
but only for a moment: Even if the principles of common sense aren’t subject
to epistemic justification— they are neither “true” nor “false”— common sense
must actually enable us to attain our goals if the pragmatic justification is to
succeed. Either we must show that the principles of common sense will be
useful, or we must accept it arbitrarily.
This is rather like the first horn of the dilemma, so I worry that this pragmatic justification does not resolve the dilemma after all. We might avoid being
dogmatists or sceptics about common sense, but we would become dogmatists
about the usefulness of common sense itself.
What relevance does this have to Reid? Baumann cautions,“To be sure:
Reid. . . does not really talk about pragmatic justification” [Bau99, p. 53]. Yet
Reid does make a kind of pragmatic move, one that is importantly more subtle.
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Reid’s pragmatic answer to the sceptic

Reid’s appeal to common sense is not a direct answer to the determined sceptic.
Reid concedes: “Perhaps the sceptic will agree to distrust reason, rather than
give any credit to perception” [Inq, ch. 6 §20, p. 183]. Although there is no
utterly compelling reason why the sceptic should not do this, Reid goes on to
offer three reasons why he and “the sober part of mankind” would not follow
the sceptic in doing so.
The second reply concerns us here: Reid suggests that actually doubting the
3

world, were such a thing possible, would only lead to disaster. Suppose, Reid
says, “I resolve not to believe my senses. I break my nose against a post that
comes in my way; I step into a dirty kennel; and, after twenty such wise rational
actions, I am taken up and clapped in a madhouse” [Inq, ch. 6 §20, p. 184].
There is a commitment in practice to the existence of an external world that
contains many of the snares and pitfalls in which realists believe. This might
be seen as the second element of Baumann’s pragmatism: We believe because
it furthers our goals of not breaking our noses, not stepping in kennels, and so
on. However, Reid’s argument is more subtle than this. He insists that sincere
scepticism would undercut practical engagement with the world and thus that
the so-called sceptic betrays a belief in the real world by managing their affairs
just as common folk do: “If a man pretends to be a sceptic with regard to the
informations of sense, and yet prudently keeps out of harm’s way as other men
do, he must excuse my suspicion, that he either acts the hypocrite, or imposes
upon himself” [Inq, ch. 6 §20, p. 184].
Reid argues that principles of common sense must be right if our everyday
lives are to make any sense, but he cannot give an unconditional defense of our
everyday lives. If sceptics see that their practice implies certain beliefs, then
they are left with a choice of abstaining from their practice or accepting the
beliefs. Reid’s argument cannot force their choice, but it makes them pay a
higher price if they cleave to scepticism. We might call this an argument from
practical commitment. If sceptics navigate the world in the way you or I do,
they already do believe in an external world. This is not subject to the usual
objection against pragmatism, because it does not require sceptics to see that
it would be in their interests to accept common sense. Sceptics are already
engaged in certain practices that show that they already do accept common
sense, whatever their verbal protestations to the contrary.
Thus, we can see Reid here as employing the pragmatic method without endorsing the pragmatic theory of truth. The distinction is due to William James,
who specifies the pragmatic method: “Whenever a dispute is serious, we ought
to be able to show some practical difference that must follow from one side or
the other’s being right” [Jam81, lec. II, p. 26]. Reid’s argument respects this
dictum: If scepticism is serious, then it binds the sceptic to whatever consequences for action there might be. If scepticism operates only in the drawing
room, it amounts to nothing.
The argument works because so-called sceptics do not carry their scepticism
out into the street, even when pressed. This is not a premise of the argument,
but rather a precondition for applying it. We need not ask ersatz sceptics to
assent to anything; we need only point at what they do. As C.S. Peirce remarks,
“It has often been argued that absolute scepticism is self-contradictory; but this
is a mistake.” Rather, “there are no such beings as absolute sceptics” [Pei92,
p. 56].
Baumann argues that Reid’s theory leads to a dilemma which could be
answered if only Reid indulged his pragmatist affinity. Reid does avoid the
dilemma, in part with a pragmatist maneuver more subtle than the one Bau-
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mann suggests for him.3 Reid applies the pragmatic method to show that the
would-be sceptic tacitly gives the lie to his scepticism by skillfully navigating
the world.
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3 It should be remembered that this is the second of three replies to the sceptic. The other
two are not so obviously pragmatist, so I leave them for another day. (See my [Mag03, ch. II].)
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